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Abstract: The austerity movement in high-income countries of Europe and North America has 
renewed calls for a guaranteed Basic Income. At the same time, conditional and unconditional  
cash transfers accompanied by rigorous impact evaluations have been conducted in low- and 
middle-income countries with the explicit support of the World Bank. Both Basic Income and 
cash transfer programs are more confidently designed when based on empirical evidence and 
social theory that explain how and why cash transfers to citizens are effective ways of encour-
aging investment in human capital through health and education spending. Are conditional cash 
transfers more effective and/or more efficient than unconditional transfers? Are means-tested 
transfers effective? This essay draws explicit parallels between Basic Income and unconditional 
cash transfers, and demonstrates that cash transfers to citizens work in remarkably similar ways 
in low-, middle- and high-income countries. It addresses the theoretical foundation of cash 
transfers. Of the four theories discussed, three explicitly acknowledge the interdependence of  
society and are based, in increasingly complex ways, on ideas of social inclusion. Only if we 
have an understanding of how cash transfers affect decision-making can we address questions 
of how best to design cash transfer schemes.
Keywords: basic income; conditional cash transfer; guaranteed annual income; negative in-
come tax; social inclusion; unconditional cash transfer
1. Introduction
On  15  April  2013,  the  lower  house  of  the  Italian 
Parliament received more than 50,000 signatures that 
had been gathered in support of a popular initiative 
regarding/for a guaranteed minimum income in Italy [1]. 
In January 2013, a European Citizens' Initiative for an 
unconditional Basic Income (BI) was registered, and 
fifteen EU states are involved in the campaign to raise 
one million signatures before 14 January 2014. On 1 
February 2013, a campaign to introduce an uncondi-
tional BI was launched in Finland. The Alaska Perman-
ent Fund, financed by state oil revenue, has granted 
dividends to all state residents since 1976, and more
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recently state Senator Chip Shields introduced a pro-
posal for a similar dividend scheme in Oregon [2]. The 
justification for many of these proposals rests expli-
citly on ideas of social inclusion, such as the European 
Parliament Resolution of 20 October 2010 on the Role 
of minimum income in combating poverty and promot-
ing  an inclusive society in Europe  (2010/2039 (INI)) 
[2].  Similar  themes resonate elsewhere.  In Canada, 
for example, Senator Hugh Segal has invoked social 
inclusivity as a justification for a BI:
Being poor would become a problem we all buffered 
in the same way as we buffer all Canadians relative 
to health care. Only a small portion of Canadians 
needs expensive health care at any one time. But 
we are there to help as members of a competitive, 
free market  and coherent  society—not  by embar-
rassing them with governments asking why they are 
sick, but by letting their universal health coverage, 
financed by general revenue, see them through [3].
This international movement builds on a long history. 
Between  1968  and  1980,  five  negative  income  tax 
experiments  were  conducted  in  North  America  with 
strong support from many of the leading economists 
of  the  period,  to  determine  what  impact,  if  any,  a 
means-tested BI might have on the labor market [4]. 
A negative income tax, or refundable tax credit, is a 
specific form of means-tested BI.
The BI movement has received new vigour from two 
sources. The growing austerity movement in Europe 
and  North  America  has  led  to  criticism from social 
justice advocates and social policy analysts who can 
measure the negative impact of budget cuts on health 
and well-being [5]. Ironically, at a time when social 
expenditure in rich countries is being constrained and 
the negative social  consequences becoming increas-
ingly  apparent,  the  World  Bank  is  advocating  cash 
transfers (CTs) to citizens of low- and middle-income 
countries as a means of reaching development goals. 
CT programs come in two flavours: conditional cash 
transfers (CCTs) in which recipients receive cash only 
if  they can demonstrate that  their  behaviour meets 
certain  stated requirements,  and unconditional  cash 
transfers (UCTs) in which the payout, in the spirit of a 
BI, does not depend on individual behaviour.
Both  BI  and  CT  experiments  have  demonstrated 
that people who receive transfers tend to behave in 
ways that  improves their  well-being, as  we demon-
strate. More children are educated for longer periods 
of time. Health improves, partly as a consequence of 
behaviours  such  as  reducing  risky  behaviour  and 
increasing vaccination rates. However, neither the BI 
movement  nor  the  CT  movement  has  developed  a 
very  convincing  theory  about  how  and  why  these 
programs improve well-being.
This  essay  draws  an  explicit  parallel  between  BI 
and CTs, and investigates how these schemes achieve 
beneficial outcomes. Section 2 examines CT schemes, 
examining  whether  it  is  the  condition  or  the  cash 
which is responsible for beneficial outcomes. Section 3 
discusses  parallel  findings  from  a  Canadian  social 
experiment known as  MINCOME, demonstrating that 
CTs  function  in  remarkably  similar  ways  in  high-
income countries, to how they do in low- and middle-
income countries. Section 4 attempts to explain how 
CTs work. Of the four theories discussed, three expli-
citly acknowledge the interdependence of society and 
are based, in increasingly complex ways, on ideas of 
social inclusion. Only if we have an understanding of how 
CTs affect decision-making can we address questions of 
how best to design CTs. Section 5 acknowledges gaps in 
our knowledge, and maps a way forward.
2. The Evidence from Conditional and 
Unconditional Cash Transfers
The two types of CT programs delivered in low- and 
middle-income  countries  give  us  some  insight  into 
how these programs are perceived to work by those 
who  propose  them.  The  World  Bank,  which  has 
offered strong support for CCTs, focuses on "incentives" 
and  incentivizing  desired  behaviour.  The  argument  is 
straightforward: if  you want someone to behave in a 
particular  way,  the  incentives  must  be  such that  the 
individual  is  rewarded for  complying. In that spirit,  a 
World Bank website claims:
Conditional cash transfers are an increasingly pop-
ular strategy for poverty reduction programs. The 
idea  behind  it  is  simple—money  is provided  to 
households that meet specific conditions. In other 
words, for a household to receive a cash transfer 
they must undertake certain activities, such as tak-
ing children for regular health check-ups and send-
ing them to school [6].
If incentives are the answer to encouraging correct 
behaviour, the implication seems to be that too little 
of the desired behaviour would exist without incent-
ives. Yet the incentivized behaviour is, or so the em-
pirical  evidence seems to  suggest,  beneficial  to  the 
individuals and families involved. If people need to be 
incentivized to act in their own best interests, then it 
must be the case that they behave otherwise largely 
because they are unaware of their own best interests. 
Part of the justification for CCTs, then, is to demon-
strate  the  rewards  that  would  accrue  to  recipients 
from incentivized behaviour.
Advocates  of  UCTs,  such as  OXFAM and UNICEF 
among others, have a very different implicit model in 
mind. They acknowledge the obvious: poverty is asso-
ciated  with  behaviours  harmful  to  individuals  and 
families. Children (particularly girls) attend school less 
and for fewer years, family nutrition tends to be worse, 
vaccination rates are usually low, marriages and child-
bearing often occur before an age consistent with op-
timal health for mother and baby, and risky behaviour 
such as sex work is more prevalent than among better 
off households [7,8].
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The solution, however, lies less in creating incent-
ives  that  reward  behaviour  consistent  with  desired 
development goals than in making resources available 
to  individual  households  so  that  they  can  make 
decisions  consistent  with  their  own  priorities.  This 
approach  is  based  on  a  trust  that  individuals  and 
families  (acknowledging  the  different  interests  that 
sometimes exist within the family) know better than 
the programme designers what kind of behaviour is in 
their  best  interests.  UCTs  are  preferred  by  human 
rights advocates and are consistent with rights-based 
approaches to development [7].
Beyond this easy dichotomy, however, some empir-
ical  evidence  has  emerged  from  the  various  CT 
schemes that can tell us more about how they work. 
Both CCTs and UCTs are consistent with positive out-
comes—more children tend to be vaccinated, people 
eat better, more girls are educated and fewer marry 
early when one compares recipients of either CT pro-
gramme to a control group that receives no CT at all 
[8-11].  Determining  whether  it  is  the  cash  or  the 
condition—the additional resources or the incentive—
that is responsible for positive outcomes is made diffi-
cult by the fact that most of the CCTs were introduced 
in Latin America, and most of the UCTs were imple-
mented in Africa.
However,  one of  the best  of  these schemes was 
conducted in Zomba province, Malawi [9].  This was 
the first experiment explicitly designed to distinguish 
between the effects of the cash itself and the behavi-
oural conditions imposed on families. Randomized at 
the level  of  the  enumeration  area,  which  contained 
several villages, three groups were constructed—one 
that received CCTs if their adolescent daughters atten-
ded school, a second that received UCTs and a third 
that acted as the control group and received no cash. 
Both  the  CCT  and  the  UCT  arm showed  increased 
school attendance, with the CCT arm marginally more 
efficient at eliciting the incentivized behaviour. However, 
learning outcomes were not different between the two 
groups  that  received  cash  transfers.  Moreover,  the 
UCT arm reduced  early  marriages,  early  births  and 
HIV transmission to a greater extent than did the CCT. 
That is, the CCT seemed to better elicit the incentivized 
behaviour—the condition—but to be less effective at 
eliciting other desired outcomes, an outcome replic-
ated in Zimbabwe [10].
The  Malawi  researchers  explain  this  outcome  by 
noting that the initial conditions of the families were 
not identical. For the poorest and most vulnerable, the 
incentive offered to educate their adolescent daughters 
was  not  sufficient  for  the  families  to  make  that 
decision. When these families in the CCT arm did not 
comply, they received no funding at all. Abandoned by 
the  programme,  these  girls  were  as  vulnerable  to 
early marriages and births, and to increased involve-
ment in sex work as were those in the control group 
who received  no  funding  from the  outset.  Similarly 
vulnerable  families  in  the  UCT  arm,  however,  also 
chose  not  to  educate  their  daughters  but  they  still 
received  the  cash  transfer  because  they  were  not 
compelled  to  comply  with  the  condition.  As  a  con-
sequence,  these  families  may  have  been  able  to 
better protect their daughters and keep them at home 
longer, even if they chose not to send them to school. 
UCTs allowed the poorest and most vulnerable to still 
receive some benefits and to allocate the money as 
they deem best—even if that allocation is not incentiv-
ized and not the preferred outcome of the programme 
designers.
A second apparently anomalous consideration was 
discussed in the Malawi study [9]. Researchers were 
concerned  that  they  may  have  underestimated  the 
impact  of  conditionality  because of  "contamination". 
Enumeration areas are small and people talk to one 
another raising the possibility  that the behaviour of 
people in the UCT arm may have been influenced by 
the conditions imposed on those in the CCT arm. The 
researchers  suggested  that  UCT  families  may  have 
misunderstood their situation. That is, they may have 
chosen  to  educate  their  daughters  because  they 
mistakenly  believed  that  they  would  otherwise  not 
receive the cash transfer. Researchers contrived a test 
of  this  hypothesis:  they  noted  that  payments  were 
made at arbitrary places designed for the convenience 
of the researchers. People from the various arms of 
the experiment received their transfers in  the same 
place. If "contamination" were to have occurred, they 
suggest,  it  should have been greatest among those 
UCT families that interacted with CCT families at the 
payment site. They found no such evidence.
If  one  were  to  change  the  language—to replace 
"contamination"  with  "social  interaction"—one might 
have  designed  the  test  differently  and  generated 
different outcomes. It is not inconceivable, for example, 
that a family may be more influenced by "cousins" in 
the  CCT  arm  than  by  arbitrary  interaction  at  the 
payment site. Moreover, the interaction may have led 
to  a  change  in  behaviour  among UCT families  that 
was not the result of error. Simple social interaction 
with friends and families in the CCT arm may have 
demonstrated  the  benefits  of  additional  education. 
This "spill-over" effect is the result of social interaction 
rather than contamination. 
A programme in Kenya—Cash Transfers for Orphans 
and Vulnerable  Children—builds  on this  evidence.  A 
paper by the Kenya CT-OVC Evaluation Team notes 
that expenditure on particular goods changed in unex-
pected  ways  among UCT programme  families—spe-
cifically, expenditure on alcohol, tobacco, food, health, 
transportation and communication [11]. These families 
were not required to drink less or spend more money 
on healthcare, and yet they chose to do so. Did they 
mistakenly believe they were subject to a condition? It 
is  worth  noting  that  one  of  the  features  of  many 
African programmes, including specifically the Kenya 
programme, is that there is a significant role for the 
community in the selection of the beneficiaries [11,
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12]. As in the case of Malawi, it is at least possible 
that it is not a mistaken belief that they were required 
to abide by conditions in order to access the cash that 
led  families  to  behave  in  ways  consistent  with  the 
conditions. Rather, the community and the interaction 
of  programme families  with  others  may  have  influ-
enced  their  behaviour.  The  communal  effects  are 
similarly strong in recent Indian pilots that emphasize 
UCTs [8].
To summarize more boldly: the condition in a CCT 
can be characterized as a price effect. Its goal is to 
encourage "appropriate" behaviour by making it more 
financially lucrative than it would be without the CCT. 
The cash transfer in either a CCT or UCT can be char-
acterized as  a  pure  income effect.  Individuals  have 
higher incomes but they make decisions about how to 
spend it based on their own tastes, preferences and 
circumstances to best meet their own perceived needs. 
Incentivization is focused on individual decision-making 
and characterizes social interaction as "contamination" 
that leads an individual into error.  Individuals, how-
ever,  are  social  creatures  who  live  in  families  and 
communities.  They  make  decisions  based  on  their 
own best guesses about their own priorities, drawing 
information  from  several  sources—the  programme 
and programme workers who have power to withhold 
CTs,  as  well  as  families  and  neighbours  who  have 
information and resources upon which they can draw 
outside the programme, and who have the power to 
reward or punish behaviour in all kinds of currencies.
3. The Canadian MINCOME Experiment
Can we generalize findings from CTs in small villages 
in sub-Saharan Africa to the BI movement in Europe 
and North America? Between 1974 and 1979, a Guar-
anteed Annual Income (GAI) experiment was conducted 
in Canada. Results were surprisingly consistent with 
the Malawi results—children stayed in school longer, 
health was improved and childbearing was delayed, all 
without the need for researchers to impose condition-
ality  on  behaviour.  The  statistical  analyses  of  the 
study are presented elsewhere [4,13].
MINCOME was  unique  among  North  American 
negative income tax experiments in that it  had two 
experimental sites, one of which was a saturation site. 
According to the prevailing wisdom of the time, the 
Winnipeg site was a classic experiment—representative 
individuals were selected from the Income Tax Rolls 
and randomized into experimental and control arms. 
All lived in the same urban community but, because 
the  proportion  of  the  total  population  enrolled  was 
small,  had little contact with one another. A second 
site,  however,  was  the  town of  Dauphin,  Manitoba, 
with a population of approximately 10,000 in the town 
and  another  2,500  in  its  rural  municipality,  which 
served as the saturation site. As in the Malawi experi-
ment, everyone in town was able to participate and 
received the same offer. In the MINCOME case, trans-
fers were means-tested so the offer was that if income 
fell  below  a  specified  threshold,  top-ups  would  be 
received according to family size and a published for-
mula. No behavioural conditions were imposed.
We were able to exploit a historical accident: uni-
versal  health insurance (with no private  alternative) 
was  introduced  into  this  jurisdiction  in  1971.  That 
means  that  we  could  access  complete  population 
health records for the entire provincial population. We 
created  a  comparison  group  by  propensity  score 
matching: every Dauphin resident was matched with 
three other provincial residents of the same age, sex, 
family type and community size. We chose comparators 
from similar geographic and social regions. The only 
difference between Dauphin residents and the com-
parators is that the former participated in  MINCOME 
[4,13].
Results were surprisingly large. Hospitalization rates 
fell  8.5% for Dauphin residents relative to the com-
parison group, with "mental health" and "accident and 
injury" hospitalizations accounting for the biggest drop. 
We  accessed  high  school  enrollment  data  and  dis-
covered that there was a "lucky cohort" of grade 12 
students—an unexpected bubble in final year registra-
tion exactly coincident with MINCOME.
With no conditionality imposed on behaviour, parti-
cipants chose to educate their children and behave in 
ways  that  reduced  poor  health.  What  is  surprising 
about these results, however, is their sheer size. Only 
30% of the families collected a stipend at any point in 
time, and for many the stipends were very modest. 
The basic payout for a family with no income from 
any source was set at 67% of the low-income cutoff 
(LICO) which is a relative measure of poverty based 
on family size and was also approximately what the 
family might have expected to receive in social assist-
ance.  A  family  of  four,  for  example,  would  receive 
$3,300, or about $16,500 in today's currency. Median 
family  income for  a  family  of  4  was  approximately 
$11,234.  As  income  from  other  sources  increased, 
however, benefits were reduced by 50% of the addi-
tional earnings and disappeared altogether at 120% 
of  the  LICO.  What  made  this  programme  different 
from  social  assistance  was  the  reduction  of  the 
threshold  effect  as  families  moved off  social  assist-
ance and into the labour market. The working poor 
still  received  some  benefits  under  MINCOME.  This 
design,  however,  means  that  many  of  the  30% of 
families who qualified for a stipend actually qualified 
for very small payments. Outcomes were much larger 
than anyone should expect them to be, particularly for 
education. It is easy to imagine why "mental health" 
should  improve  if  you  reduce  the  stress  that  is 
associated  with  poverty,  but  why  should  "accidents 
and injuries" decline?
When  we  tried  to  explain  these  apparent  anom-
alies, we interviewed participants. We were prevented 
by  the  institutional  ethics  board  from  contacting 
participants,  but  we  published  stories  in  the  local 
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press and used word of mouth to invite people to talk 
to us. While this strategy no doubt led to some bias in 
our results, it  soon became clear to us how closely 
people are connected and how the behaviour of one 
influences  another.  A  seventeen-year  old,  trying  to 
decide whether to commit to school for another year, 
will  consider  (along  with  his  parents)  many  factors 
such as the projected income of the family from all 
sources, including  MINCOME.  Subjects reported that 
many of these young men were under considerable 
pressure  before  the  experiment  to  become  self-
supporting. Could the family afford to support him for 
another year? Could they do without his income? Was 
he  needed to  work  on the  farm?  MINCOME meant 
that  at  least  some of  these  vulnerable  adolescents 
were  permitted  to  attend  school  for  another  year. 
From the adolescent's point of view, however, another 
factor looms large. What would his friends be doing? 
If MINCOME exists, a greater proportion of his friends 
will decide to go to school. The more of his friends 
who attend, the more likely he will attend. That is, the 
income supplement has both a direct and an indirect 
effect,  the  latter  resulting  from  social  interaction. 
Individual decisions are influenced by others, but this 
is not the result of a mistaken belief that the children 
were required to attend school in order for the family 
to receive the stipend. Is this not also a more likely 
explanation for the proclivity of Malawian girls in the 
UCT group to go to school, than uncontrolled mingling 
and  "contamination"  of  information  at  the  payment 
distribution centre?
What about "accidents and injuries"? Why should 
they decline? Many hospitalizations with an "accident 
and  injury"  code  are  undeniably  social  in  nature. 
Violence  of  all  types,  including  family  violence,  is 
associated with poverty and stress. Alcohol abuse and 
associated automobile  accidents  are associated with 
poverty and income insecurity. The less violence and 
substance abuse exist in a community, the less likely 
any resident is to be a victim. Both individual beha-
viour and the behaviour of one's neighbours, family 
and friends influence the likelihood of these types of 
hospitalizations.  Receiving a cash transfer oneself  is 
protective, but so is the receipt of a cash transfer by 
others in town.
Most of the people we talked to emphasized the 
community nature of MINCOME. In the words of one 
participant:
"It was to bring your income up to where it should 
be.  It  was  enough  to  add  some  cream  to  the 
coffee.  Everyone was the same so there was no 
shame" [14].
As  was  the  case  for  Malawians,  the  interaction 
effects in CT schemes are significant. I want to sug-
gest  that  programmes  such  as  a  BI  affect  social 
outcomes at levels beyond that of the individual. We 
are  all  connected  in  some  very  demonstrable  and 
concrete ways. As both the CT experiments in Africa 
and  Latin  America  and  the  Canadian  MINCOME 
Experiment suggest,  cash  transfers  do  improve 
investment in human capital. Behaviour does change 
and development goals are met. What is lacking is a 
theoretical foundation that explains how they work.
4. Theory and Design
It is important to understand how CTs work because 
the  theoretical  foundation  conditions  the  optimal 
design of the programme. A number of issues remain 
unresolved.  Should the  programme be universal,  or 
should it be conditional on income or behaviour? Who 
should be targeted? How large should the transfer be? 
And, not unrelated to any of the above, how much will 
it  cost?  The  factors  interact  with  one  another  and 
depend on how we imagine a CT to influence behaviour. 
Cash transfers to individuals or families have two 
components. If there is a behavioural condition, the 
condition works to create incentives that change the 
mix of goods and services purchased by individuals, 
usually  emphasizing  those  associated  with  human 
capital  formation.  That is,  it  becomes financially  re-
warding for the family to engage in the conditioned 
behaviour.  The  cash  transfer  itself,  however,  raises 
family income. How does the income effect influence 
behaviour?
Consider four theories about how a cash transfer 
works to change behaviour:
i. CTs  work  by  reducing  poverty  and  increasing 
income. As income increases, individuals spend 
less money on some goods and more on normal 
or luxury goods;
ii. CTs work by reducing risk.  A CT is  a  form of 
social  insurance  that  increases  the  planning 
horizon and allows one to take calculated risks;
iii. CTs  work  by  reducing  income inequality,  envy 
and competition;
iv. CTs work by changing social values and building 
communities through  social  interaction.  Social 
inclusion is facilitated.
As  we  move  down the  list,  the  focus  is  less  on 
individual decision-making and more on the interaction 
of families within a community, but these theories are 
not mutually exclusive. Does the evidence support any 
or all of these mechanisms?
4.1. CTs Work by Reducing Poverty
Without question, how we spend our income changes 
as family income increases. Even Maslow recognized that:
"It is quite true that man lives by bread alone—
when  there  is  no  bread.  But  what  happens  to 
man's desires when there is plenty of bread and 
when his belly is chronically filled?" [15]
Manley et al. published a systematic review of 18 
programmes in 11 countries to determine the impact 
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of CTs and UCTs on nutritional status [16]. They found 
that if the programme imposed educational or health 
conditions, nutritional status improved as much as it 
did  in  programmes  with  no  conditions.  However  if 
conditions related to working and saving were imposed, 
nutritional status suffered. This review was limited by 
the fact that CCTs were mostly in the middle-income 
countries  of  Latin  America  and  the  UCTs  in  lower-
income African countries, but the finding is telling. Given 
the freedom to do so, a family will meet its most press-
ing needs first. An increase in income will be spent on 
food if food is lacking. As income increases, however, 
expenditure  on  food  will  not  continue  to  increase 
proportionally. Some inferior goods will be replaced by 
higher-priced alternatives as resources increase.
What  about  other  decisions?  One  of  the  most 
universal findings is that as income increases, the age 
of first birth increases and total number of children in 
a  family  declines.  As  income  increases,  family  ex-
penditure on education increases although rarely does 
expenditure  increase  equally  for  all  children.  Very 
often, a family will make a rational decision to educate 
a son rather than a daughter who will  leave to go 
marry into another family. This explains why so many 
CCTs are focused on the education of girls, but it also 
explains why more girls are educated in Malawi even 
in families in the UCT arm. As income increases, the 
family can afford the luxury of educating its daugh-
ters. Even without an incentive—without conditionality
—it is easy to understand that what is perceived as an 
unattainable luxury at one income, such as educating 
a daughter for someone else, becomes indispensable 
at a higher income.
Similar, but culturally distinct, findings appeared in 
the  MINCOME study in Canada. As income increased 
during the experiment, families could afford the luxury 
of allowing children to remain in school longer. In this 
case, the luxury was in allowing potentially productive 
sons  to  remain  in  high school;  there  was  relatively 
well-paying  work  available  to  strong  young  men. 
Daughters were usually already encouraged to graduate; 
in  the  mid-1970s  in  a  small  town,  their  potential 
employment income was  limited.  Obviously,  context 
matters but the insight is universal. 
The most  apparent  way  that  CTs  work  is  by  in-
creasing income. Investment in human capital—edu-
cation and health—will  increase with family  income. 
This implies that any CT, with or without a condition, 
will  improve  human  capital  formation  if  it  is  large 
enough. The condition may amplify the result but, as 
Manley's study demonstrates, a condition might achieve 
the incentivized outcome by reducing other laudable 
goals  that  the  family  would have chosen given the 
opportunity [15]. The lesson is clear: conditions are 
unnecessary for some outcomes. If a condition is to 
be imposed, it is essential to choose carefully.
Moreover,  since  expenditure  patterns  depend  on 
income, it follows that the poorest and most vulner-
able families may choose to spend their money differ-
ently than those who are better off. UCTs give families 
the freedom to allocate their income as they choose. 
If  families  choose not to meet the condition,  either 
because the incentive is not large enough or because 
their  resources are so constrained that  they cannot 
comply, they will  be withdrawn from the study. This 
has  obvious  ethical  implications,  but  it  also  affects 
costs and cost-effectiveness. CCTs become more eco-
nomical because non-complying families are not paid. 
The ultimate cost of the programme will be lower than 
a comparable UCT that will pay all families. 
4.2. CTs Work by Reducing Risk
In Canada, support for a BI is  overtly compared to 
universal health insurance and portrayed as a means 
to reduce risk. It is explicitly characterized as a way of 
socializing uncertainty and based on the idea that "we 
are there to help, as members of…a society" [3].
Everyone lives with some economic uncertainty and 
the further down the income scale you are, the more 
uncertainty  characterizes  your  life.  Many  economic 
decisions affect the future. A decision to send a child 
to school may involve a commitment of several months. 
A decision to take a loan to buy a house or a car may 
involve  a  commitment  of  several  years.  Before  the 
transaction is complete, a job may be lost or health 
compromised. CTs reduce economic uncertainty. The 
insurance effect is  designed to encourage long-term 
planning  which  is  the  basis  of  any  investment  de-
cision, whether in human, social, cultural or physical 
capital. In the case of human capital formation, it is 
designed to influence future generations.
The  insurance  effect,  though,  goes  beyond  the 
individual or the family involved. One of the outstanding 
design issues is whether CTs should be income-tested. 
If the design is such that a family receives a stipend 
only if they qualify for support on the basis of a means 
test, it will not be universal. It will, however, have an 
effect on everyone whether or not they qualify for a 
stipend. It will reduce uncertainty for everyone by set-
ting a minimum beneath which a family income cannot 
fall. This will have the effect of lengthening the time 
horizon and allowing a family to undertake some risk 
even if, in the event, they do not qualify for support.
4.3. CTs Work Because Income Inequality Is Reduced
Some  poor  social  outcomes—addictions,  crime,  poor 
educational outcomes and chronic health conditions—
are distributed across a community, even though they 
may  afflict  the  poorest  most  heavily.  By  definition, 
income  inequality  is  a  social  measure.  An  income-
tested CT reduces income inequality and will  have a 
differential effect across the income spectrum. Every-
one benefits and the poorest, who suffer disproportion-
ately, benefit most.
None  of  the  studies  to  date  has  been  able  to 
distinguish empirically between an effect that works 
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through the reduction of income inequality and one 
that works through the reduction of absolute poverty. 
4.4. CTs Work by Changing Social Values and Building  
Community through Social Interaction
Spillover effects occur when the decisions made by one 
person or  a  family  affects  others.  Obvious examples 
include vaccinations: unvaccinated people benefit from 
those who choose to vaccinate their children because 
herd  immunity  means  they  are  less  likely  to  be 
infected; education: children attend school when their 
cousins and neighbours  attend school,  whether they 
live  in  Canada or  Malawi.  STIs and crime are other 
examples; both require intimate social interaction.
Spillover effects make CTs extremely cost-effective 
ways of intervening in society because these effects 
act like social multipliers: raising your income makes 
you  less  likely  to  abuse  illicit  substances.  I  benefit 
because I am less likely to be the victim of your illegal 
activities.  Raising my income makes  my child  more 
likely to finish high school; you benefit because your 
child will be influenced by the decisions made by my 
child. Addressing the needs of the poorest means that 
relatively small investments can have large effects. 
CTs  can  affect  the  outcomes  and  behaviours  of 
people who never collect and, under any reasonable 
forecast,  are never likely  to  collect  a stipend either 
because they have been assigned to a control group 
or  because  the  stipend  is  means-tested.  They  are 
nonetheless affected, not because of the "contamina-
tion" that most of the CT studies acknowledge, but 
because  human interaction  changes  social  attitudes 
and behavioural norms.
5. Some Final Thoughts
Rigorously  designed CCTs  and,  more  recently,  UCTs 
have generated a great deal of empirical knowledge 
about the impact of cash transfers to families in low- 
and middle-income countries.  However,  the absence 
of a well-developed theoretical foundation that attempts 
to  explain  how such schemes  influence  human de-
cision-making  means  that  crucial  design  questions 
continue to resonate. Social theory does exist that can 
be  drawn  upon  to  help  support  the  design  of  CT 
schemes [17-19]. However, it has not been developed 
in the context of BI and CT analyses.
Debates about the joint and separate effects of the 
condition  and  the  cash  in  generating  desired  out-
comes persist. The role of social interaction remains 
largely unexplored, beyond appendices attempting to 
discount the presence of "contamination". The insur-
ance effect remains largely unexplored, which means 
that  the  questions  of  which  families  ought  to  be 
targeted and whether a means-tested scheme might 
be as effective (and cheaper) than a universal scheme 
are ignored.
Simultaneously, BI advocates in Europe and North 
America to a significant extent subsist in a world of 
theory because there have been no large-scale experi-
ments  in  high-income  countries  since  the  1970s. 
Moreover, almost all of the experiments conducted at 
that  time  used  a  dispersed  sample  which  was  not 
capable of detecting the social  interaction—the con-
tamination—that seemed to amplify the results of the 
Canadian  MINCOME experiment  as  it  amplified  the 
results of the Zomba experiment in Malawi. This essay 
has made a tentative step towards integrating these 
two solitudes. 
CTs affect behaviour and outcomes through a variety 
of mechanisms, and the empirical evidence from CT 
experiments  in  Africa  and  Latin  America  can  offer 
some guidance to the optimal design of BI schemes in 
high-income countries. A CCT is a more cost-effective 
way to encourage outcomes selected by experts than 
a UCT or BI. Both CCTs and UCTs encourage investment 
in human capital, but the condition may have an addi-
tional impact on encouraging the conditioned behaviour. 
Both  CCTs  and  UCTs  act  as  social  insurance  which 
reduces  the  risk  of  forward-looking  decisions.  As  a 
consequence,  both  increase  investment  in  human, 
social,  cultural  and physical  capital, whether  or  not 
the behaviour is required as a condition for payment. 
Any effects of a CT will be magnified by social interac-
tion.  The  more  the  decisions  of  one  person  affect 
another, the more effective such a scheme will be. 
However, the cost per unit of outcome will be higher 
with a UCT because a UCT will continue to pay those 
families  who  choose  not  to  comply.  From  a  policy 
perspective, the costs of an unconditional BI (like the 
costs of any UCT) will exceed those of income support 
schemes  with  behavioural  conditions  attached.  If, 
however,  you  trust  families  more  than  you  trust 
programme designers to choose desirable outcomes, 
then cash with no strings attached is to be preferred. 
Both the theory and the empirical results tell us that 
families  can  be  trusted  to  allocate  their  resources 
where they will achieve the greatest return—whether 
or  not  their  choices  align  with  the  vision  of  the 
programme designers. The higher cost of uncondition-
ality is  the social  price for offering all  residents the 
opportunity to participate fully in society. 
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